By Olayemi Esan
The Nigerian military has once again found itself battling not only terrorists in the field, but also a fierce war of perception at home.
At the centre of the latest controversy is Operation Safe Corridor—a programme many Nigerians have come to distrust, misunderstand or outright reject.
This week, the Coordinator of the programme, Brigadier General Yusuf Ali, did what the military should have done more aggressively long ago: he confronted the suspicion head-on.
And his central message was blunt:
No, the military is not recruiting repentant Boko Haram fighters into the Nigerian Army.
That clarification was necessary because the allegation has spread far and wide, feeding public anger and deepening cynicism around the country’s counter-insurgency strategy.
At the Defence Headquarters monthly media briefing in Abuja, Ali insisted that Operation Safe Corridor is not a military recruitment channel, and anyone with a criminal record cannot be enlisted into the Army or, by extension, any security service.
That point should matter.
Because in a country where public trust in institutions is already fragile, the idea that former terrorists are being absorbed into the military is explosive.
But here is where the debate becomes uncomfortable—and complicated.
The Moral Outrage Is Understandable
Many Nigerians hear “repentant Boko Haram” and immediately think of murderers, arsonists, kidnappers and mass killers being rehabilitated while victims are left to bury the dead and rebuild shattered communities.
That outrage is real. It is emotional. And frankly, it is understandable.
But Ali’s explanation forces a more difficult distinction—one the public often resists.
Not everyone who emerged from Boko Haram territory was a willing terrorist.
Some were abducted. Some were conscripted. Some were kidnapped from highways. Some were forced to fetch water, carry supplies or fight under threat of death.
In other words, some of those processed through Operation Safe Corridor are not “repentant terrorists” in the strict sense.
They are survivors of terrorist captivity who must still be screened, stabilised and reintroduced to society.
That is the argument.
The Real Issue Is Trust
The military says only low-risk individuals—those screened by the Ministry of Justice and other agencies—are sent into the programme.
Hard-core fighters, it says, are prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned through the criminal justice system.
If that process is truly as rigorous as presented, then Operation Safe Corridor is less about “forgiving terrorists” and more about managing the aftermath of coercive radicalisation.
The problem is not merely the policy.
The problem is public trust.
Too many Nigerians do not believe the screening process is transparent enough. Too many communities feel they are not consulted enough. Too many victims feel justice is discussed in theory but not seen in practice.
That is why the military’s communication gap has been costly.
For years, Operation Safe Corridor has been explained in bureaucratic language while misinformation spread in emotional language.
And in public discourse, emotion almost always wins.
A Security Policy That Needs Public Legitimacy
The military is right about one thing: not every conflict is solved purely by bullets.
Counter-insurgency requires both kinetic and non-kinetic strategies. It requires battlefield dominance, yes—but also de-radicalisation, peacebuilding and reintegration where appropriate.
If every abducted or conscripted civilian is treated as an irredeemable terrorist, the state risks deepening the same cycles of alienation and violence it claims to be dismantling.
But if the state is going to pursue rehabilitation, then it must do so with maximum transparency, stronger victim-sensitive communication, and visible accountability.
That means Nigerians must see clearly:
Who qualifies for Safe Corridor
Who is excluded
Who is prosecuted
How communities are protected
How reintegration is monitored
Without those answers, suspicion will persist.
Brig.-Gen. Yusuf Ali has offered perhaps one of the clearest official explanations yet of what Operation Safe Corridor is—and what it is not.
It is not a recruitment centre. It is not a reward scheme for hard-core terrorists. And it is not an alternative to criminal prosecution.
But in a war where truth is often the first casualty, clarity cannot be occasional.
The military may be right on the facts.
Now it must win the confidence battle too.
The Bigger Security Debate
Even with the military’s clarifications, Operation Safe Corridor remains one of the most contentious pillars of Nigeria’s counter-insurgency strategy.
To some Nigerians, reintegration of any former insurgent-linked person remains morally difficult to accept. To the military, however, the programme reflects the complicated realities of a war in which many civilians were dragged into terror networks against their will.
For now, the Armed Forces appear determined to defend the programme as both a security necessity and a humanitarian obligation.
But Brig.-Gen. Ali’s core message was unmistakable:
Operation Safe Corridor is not a recruitment centre. It is not a reward for terror. And it is not a substitute for justice.
Oluwapelumi Olayemi Esan is a Defence Correspondent, a broadcast Journalist and Public Relations practitioner and the MD of Spye Communications Limited (SpyeTV). She can be reached via email
